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Employment Research
Myth 12. Individual accounts would
not affect labor supply and retirement
age because they closely link
contributions and benefits.
There is a close link between
contributions and the amount invested in
an individual account. Also, individual
accounts would not be financed by an
explicit tax, which would distort labor
supply. However, the volatility in stock
and bond markets causes there to be
a weak link between contributions
and benefits. Further, a mandatory
contribution, whatever its link to
benefits, can be an implicit tax because
it is mandatory. If the mandatory
contributions act like an implicit tax, that
would discourage workers from working
and encourage them to retire. The low
participation rates of workers in Latin
American mandatory accounts may
result from such an effect on their labor
supply. In addition, a sharp downturn in
equity markets can cause workers with
individual accounts to delay retirement,
with that effect occurring at a time when
the demand for labor is reduced.
John Turner is a senior policy advisor
at the AARP Public Policy Institute in
Washington, D.C.
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Earnings Losses
for Injured Workers
S

ince publishing Adequacy of
Earnings Replacement in Workers’
Compensation Programs in 2004 (Hunt
2004), staff at the Upjohn Institute have
continued to analyze the important
policy issues discussed in the report. The
National Academy of Social Insurance
(NASI) study panel that produced the
report found that earnings replacement
for permanent partial disabilities
in five states ranged from 29 to 46
percent—a rate far short of the 67 percent
replacement rate specified by statute
in these state workers’ compensation
systems. Thus, the analysis raised
concerns about the adequacy of workers’
compensation earnings replacement
benefits.

The NASI study panel’s
analysis raised concerns about
the adequacy of workers’
compensation earnings
replacement benefits.
However, there were some problems
with these findings. First, employer
representatives on the study panel
objected to using the two-thirds
earnings replacement standard for
permanent partial disability (PPD)
cases. They asserted that because
such cases are frequently disputed
and their compensation may be the
result of compromise settlements, it
is inappropriate to expect such claims
to achieve the two-thirds standard.
Therefore, the study panel believed
it would be beneficial to assess the
adequacy of temporary total disability
benefits.
In addition, there were analytical
issues that affected the results, even
though the same assumptions had been
used for studying the five states. Because

the analysis focused on aggregate wage
losses and aggregate compensation
payments, it implicitly weighted the
more serious claims more heavily. The
longer the wage loss continues, the more
times the injured worker is counted in
the aggregate wage losses. But is the
policy question, what proportion of all
the wages lost by injured workers is
replaced? Or is it, what proportion of all
injured workers received adequate wage
replacement? The earlier studies answer
the first question, but not the second.
Data Analysis
To find the answer to that question,
the Upjohn Institute contracted with the
State of Oregon for administrative data
that enabled us to perform a sensitivity
analysis of benefit adequacy in Oregon’s
workers’ compensation system. Our
empirical work uses a dataset composed
of 46,033 Oregon workers injured
in 1992 or 1993. They all received
temporary disability payments of at
least three days, or PPD compensation.
We exclude workers with disabilities
lasting less than three days, and those
with missing values for certain key
variables. We also exclude workers aged
51 and older at the time of injury in
order to reduce the effect of voluntary
early retirement on postinjury wage loss
calculations.
We have unemployment insurance
data, which consist of quarterly wage
records for all Oregon workers from the
first quarter of 1988 through the fourth
quarter of 1998. We were able to match
98.8 percent of injured workers to their
administrative wage records (based on a
unique but anonymous identifier provided
for each worker). The resulting dataset
combines claims-related data such as date
and type of injury, compensation benefits,
length of absence from work, and
demographic variables, with the pre- and
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Figure 1 Changes in Quarterly Wages Relative to Own Preinjury Wage, Injured
Workers (age ≤ 50), and a Sample of Uninjured Workers
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postinjury wage record for each injured
worker. We include 5 preinjury quarters,
the quarter of injury, and 20 postinjury
quarters.
The cumulative wage change is
calculated by summing the differences
between observed postinjury quarterly
wages and the wage in the preinjury
quarter for each injured worker. We
include 20 postinjury quarters, although
we do not observe earnings in all of
them for many of the workers, due to the
incidence of missing (unreported) wages.
Finally, we compute the wage growth for
uninjured workers using the same method
and use it as a baseline against which
to assess the earnings losses of injured
workers.

to $23,892, or 31 percent, during these
years. So the average increase in real
annual earnings for uninjured workers
in Oregon during our observation period
was $5,586, and the total increase over
the period was almost $10,000.
On average, the 7,480 Oregon workers
who suffered a short-term total temporary
disability injury (3–7 lost workdays) in
1992 and 1993 had an earnings loss over
five years of $1,123 when compared
to the random sample of uninjured
Oregon workers from the same period.

Earnings Losses

Interestingly, only $212 of this earnings
loss occurs in the actual quarter of injury.
So there appears to be a persistent wage
loss for even these relatively mild injuries
in Oregon.
For moderate injuries involving
between 8 and 30 days of work lost, the
average five-year wage loss compared
to uninjured workers is $3,545. Serious
injuries involving 31–60 days lost work
(6–12 weeks) carry commensurately
more serious wage losses of $6,422.
Severe injuries involving more than 60
lost workdays mean an average earnings

Using a 10 percent random sample
of all unemployment insurance wage
records in Oregon, and ignoring the
observations with zero for wages (a
mixture of those who really had no
earnings and those whose earnings were
not reported), we find that the typical
Oregon worker’s cumulative earnings
increased by $9,943 in 1993 dollars in the
five years from 1993 to 1998. Average
annual real earnings for uninjured
Oregon workers increased from $18,306



Wage losses associated with
workers’ compensation claims
may be permanent.

loss of $10,359 compared to uninjured
workers.
Figure 1 shows these results. Starting
from the preinjury quarterly earnings
at time t = −1, the earnings of injured
workers (except the 3–7 day group)
decline in the quarter of injury (t = 0)
and in the following quarter (t = 1).
Then earnings begin to recover but never
overtake the earnings of the uninjured
workers, at least not within five years. It
takes two quarters for earnings to recover
to the preinjury level for those with 8–30
days lost. It takes three quarters for those
with paid disability durations of 31–60
days, and 7 quarters for those losing
more than 60 days (12 weeks) of work
to a workers’ compensation claim. In
fact, at the end of five years, those who
were originally off work for more than 60
days were still suffering earnings losses
of nearly $500 per quarter compared to
the earnings gains of uninjured workers.
Permanent partial disability claimants
recover their preinjury earnings by 6
quarters following injury, but after 5
years (20 quarters) they have similar
continuing losses of just over $500 per
quarter.
Earnings Replacement
Wage losses continue long after one
might have assumed the effects of the
injury would have ended. In fact, Figure
1 shows that wage losses associated
with workers’ compensation claims may
be permanent. Evidently the injury has
produced an interruption in the income
stream that is never fully recovered, even
for injuries involving as little as 8 days
off work. While wage growth returns
to something like the same rate as for
uninjured workers, the initial loss is never
made up. So the question is, how is the
workers’ compensation system dealing
with these losses?
Table 1 shows the mean wage loss,
mean compensation paid, and real
earnings replacement rates for the paid
disability duration classes used earlier.
Again, we used the preinjury earnings
for each individual and accumulated
losses for five years following the injury,
as compared to the earnings growth of
uninjured Oregon workers. Under these
assumptions, it appears that the actual
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Table 1 Estimated Losses, Compensation, and Replacement Rates,
by Paid Disability Duration
Groups by paid
duration of disability
TTD 3–7 days
TTD 8–30 days
TTD 31–60 days
TTD > 60 days
PPD

N

Aggregate real
replacement rate
(%)

7,480
9,303
3,162
2,468
12,655

23.9
23.1
31.6
68.7
152.6

wage-loss replacement rate increases
with the duration of disability, with PPD
claimants doing the best. Of course, it
should be pointed out that, under the
assumption that the PPD claimants have
lifelong (or permanent) impairments,
their earnings losses will continue far
beyond the five-year mark.
This in turn will serve to lower the
replacement rate since nearly all workers’
compensation payments have been
completed within five years while the
losses continue, presumably far beyond.
But the real surprise is the continuing

Mean
earnings loss
(1993 $)
1,123
3,545
6,422
10,359
8,764

Mean
compensation
(1993 $)
268
820
2,028
7,117
13,373

nature of earnings losses after five years.
Conclusion
Although it is clear that compensable
workers’ compensation injuries involve
significant permanent wage loss for
many workers, it is not clear why.
Is this more like a displaced worker
phenomenon? Research from the Workers
Compensation Research Institute (2006)
highlights the fact that a significant
minority of injured workers do not
achieve a “substantial” return to work,

ranging from 10 percent in Wisconsin
and Pennsylvania to 25 percent in Texas.
We need a better understanding of this
research before reaching a definitive
judgment of the adequacy of workers’
compensation earnings replacement
benefits.
H. Allan Hunt is assistant executive
director, Kelly DeRango is a research fellow,
and Eva Madly is a research associate, all at
the Upjohn Institute.
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The Economics of Voluntary
Disclosure in SAT Scores
Gabrielle Chapman, Michael Conlin,
and Stacy Dickert-Conlin
Syracuse University
An increasing number of colleges
have made reporting SAT I (the twopart standardized verbal and math test)
scores voluntary. These schools argue
that the test score differentials in the SAT
are not a result of aptitude differences
but rather biases in the test that favors
particular groups. The game theoretic
models of voluntary disclosure suggests
that if revealing SAT scores is voluntary
and slightly costly, only those students
with the low SAT scores will withhold
their scores (i.e., the “unraveling”
equilibrium). All others will reveal their
scores to avoid the assumption that
they have extremely low scores. Using
proprietary admissions data from a
college with such a policy, we find that

this trend generally holds for students
with very high SAT scores—even
conditional on observables, these students
submit their SAT scores. Yet, applicants
with relatively low SAT scores are less
likely to withhold their scores than
students with midrange SAT scores.
In addition to testing the theory of
voluntary disclosure, two other trends in
education policy and practice motivate
this research. The first is the paradox
represented by this trend toward making
standardized test scores optional in
college admissions paired with the
increased reliance on standardized
testing in other education arenas, such
the estimated $500 million per year test
preparation industry and President Bush’s
education reform agenda. That agenda
includes the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001, which requires states to develop
a grade by grade standardized testing
system as a measure of accountability.
The second motivating policy issue
for our research is the ongoing policy

challenge in higher education that seeks
to equalize college access, particularly
among those students historically most
underrepresented. The differential effect
on college access of making SAT scores
optional in the admission process has
not been thoroughly evaluated. After
conditioning on observables, we find
evidence that female applicants are still
more likely to not submit their SAT
scores, but we find very little evidence
that the same is true for minorities.

The Educational Progress of
Immigrant Children:
California in Perspective
Deborah Garvey
Santa Clara University
Twenty percent of children under age
18 in the United States had at least one
immigrant parent in 2000. In California,
by contrast, the share was more than
double at nearly 50 percent. Since



